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Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for inﬁnite
overlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as a
Nash equilibrium. But, of course, there are other equilibria. This paper investigates
experimentally whether cooperation actually occurs in a simple overlapping gener-
ations game. Subjects both play the game and formulate strategies. Our main
ﬁnding is that subjects fail to exploit the intertemporal structure of the game. Even
when we provided subjects with a recommendation to play the grim trigger
strategy, most of the subjects still employed safe history-independent strategies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ž. The overlapping generations model,ﬁrst introduced by Samuelson 1958 ,
has become a standard tool in economics. It has been used to study a wide
variety of issues, such as the sustainability of old-age pension schemes
Ž. Ž Hammond, 1975 , the time consistency of optimal tax policies Kotlikoff
.Ž et al., 1988 , the relation between growth and environment John and
. Pecchenino, 1994 , the conditions for the optimal provision of club goods
Ž. Ž . Sandler, 1982 , the relation between regulators and ﬁrms Salant, 1995 ,
and the interaction between old and young members of a political party
Ž. Alesina and Spear, 1988 . In many of these applications, a central ques-
tion is whether and under what conditions the efﬁcient or cooperative
outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium. Often it is found that, under
certain conditions, this is indeed the case. For example, Hammond shows
that an efﬁcient pay-as-you-go pension scheme can be supported as an
equilibrium outcome if the players employ trigger strategies. The possibil-
ity of cooperation in overlapping generations has been studied and estab-
lished more generally. Folk theorems similar to the ones for ‘‘usual’’
Ž inﬁnitely repeated games may arise Cremer, 1986; Salant, 1991; Smith,
. 1992 .
In all of these studies cooperation is one of the equilibrium outcomes,
but not the only one. As in inﬁnitely repeated games, typically, there are
many equilibria in inﬁnite overlapping generations games. Sometimes
additional criteria are advanced to argue that a particular equilibrium is
Ž. more reasonable. For example, Hammond 1975 suggests that the players
will realize that the cooperative equilibrium is in their own interest and
that it is reasonable to assume that they will coordinate on this equilib-
rium. Usually, however, authors seem content to establish that a particular
cooperative or efﬁcient outcome is an equilibrium. Note, though, that
players aiming at a cooperative equilibrium expose themselves to the risk
of ending up with the worst-possible outcome: they cooperate while their
successor defects. How actual players solve this dilemma is, of course,
Ž. ultimately an empirical matter Lucas, 1986 .
In the present paper we ‘‘put the theory to the test.’’ We let subjects
play a simple overlapping generations game. The structure of the game is
Ž. identical to the Pension Game studied by Hammond 1975 . It is the
simplest overlapping generations game that is not strategically trivial. The
game is played by an inﬁnite sequence of players, P ,P ,P ,... . The ﬁrst 123
player P does not make a choice. Each subsequent player makes one 1
 4 Ž. choice only from the set A,B . If the second player P chooses A B , P 21
Ž. receives 50 30 . Each subsequent player P’s payoff is determined by his t
Ž. own choice and by the choice of the next player P , his successor t  2. t1NOTE 266
TABLE I
Payoff Scheme: Payoff to Player Pt
Choice of Player Pt1
Choice of Player P AB t
A5 0 1 5
B7 0 3 0
Table I shows the payoff scheme. This payoff scheme is common knowl-
edge.
In this game there are two focal outcomes: one noncooperative and one
cooperative. If all players choose B, then all will earn 30. This noncoopera-
tive outcome is an equilibrium according to the following argument. If
player P believes that the choice by player P will be independent of his tt 1
own choice, then clearly it is in his best interest to choose B. Whatever the
Ž. choice of P A or B , if it does not depend on the choice of P , then it is t1 t
a best reply for P to play B. This argument is similar to the dominance t
argument that leads to noncooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma.
If all players choose to play A, however, then all will receive a payoff of
50. This is the cooperative outcome. It can be supported by a trigger
strategy. Suppose that player P believes that player P will play A if and tt 1
only if all previous players have played A; then it will be in his interest to
play A if and only if all previous players have played A. Therefore, this
‘‘grim trigger’’ strategy is self-enforcing. The cooperative outcome can be
supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium if each player is informed
about the choices of all previous players, and if there is an inﬁnite
Ž. 2 sequence of players cf. Bhaskar, 1998 .
In our baseline treatment we investigate whether subjects spontaneously
devise trigger strategies supporting the cooperative outcome. Subjects both
make a choice and formulate a strategy to play the game. The latter
information gives us more direct and detailed evidence on the strategies
considered by our subjects.
2The game has many equilibria. In fact, with mixed strategies any outcome and any payoff
between the cooperative and the noncooperative payoff can be supported as an equilibrium
Ž. A Ž B. Bhaskar, 1998, Theorem 2 . Let pp be the probability that player t  1 plays A when
Ž. AB player t plays A B . It is straightforward to check that, with p  37  87p , whatever
the history of play, each player will be indifferent between playing A and B, thus justifying the
mixed strategies. Hence, each outcome can be an equilibrium outcome and by varying pA
B Ž. and p each average payoff in the interval 30,50 can be supported. Restricting attention to
Ž. pure strategy equilibria, only outcomes of the form B,...,B,A,A,A,... can be supported;
that is, there can never be a B choice after an A choice. Otherwise, each player choosing A
followed by B would have an incentive to deviate.NOTE 267
In our recommendation treatment we provide subjects with a recom-
mendation supporting the cooperative equilibrium. This recommendation
was suggested by one of the subjects in the baseline treatment. It amounts
to the grim trigger strategy. This strategy has the advantage of being both
Ž. subgame perfect contrary to, e.g., ‘‘tit-for-tat’’ and simple. Previous
experimental work shows that recommendations affect subjects’ play in
Ž. some circumstances. Van Huyck et al. 1992 ﬁnd the result that subjects
tend to follow equilibrium recommendations as long as they do not conﬂict
with payoff dominance or symmetry. The results of Brandts and McLeod
Ž. 1995 are mixed in this respect. In some of their games recommendations
matter for subjects’ play. However, they also construct a game where the
perfect equilibrium does not coincide with the Pareto-efﬁcient equilibrium.
In that game subjects do not tend to follow the recommended efﬁcient
equilibrium strategy.
Ours is not the ﬁrst experimental study of overlapping generations. For
Ž. example, Cadsby and Frank 1990 study Ricardian equivalence in an
Ž. overlapping generations experiment. Lim et al. 1994 and Marimon and
Ž. Sunder 1993 study expectation formation in an experiment in which the
value of money savings depends on future prices as determined by the
behavior of future generations. These experiments have a focus different
from ours and are much more complex than our simple ‘‘pension game.’’ A
paper with a focus similar to the present one is Van der Heijden et al.
Ž. 1998 . They study the occurrence of cooperative transfers in a ﬁnite
overlapping generations game. Strictly speaking, however, in their experi-
ment cooperation is not an equilibrium. Furthermore, in all of these
studies the subjects play the game repeatedly, which may introduce other
reasons for cooperation than those purely based on the dynamic structure
of the overlapping generations game. It is the latter that is the focus of the
Ž present study. Moreover, by using the strategy method alongside simple
. play of the game we can see whether subjects actually use trigger
strategies to exploit the dynamic structure of the game.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted with the help of the computer. The
Ž instructions were distributed to subjects and read aloud a transcription of
. the instructions and the data is available from the authors upon request .
We used neutral terminology when explaining the game. For example, we
avoided words like ‘‘cooperating.’’ First we explain the baseline treatment.
Then we focus on the recommendation treatment.
In the experiment, of course, it is impossible to have an inﬁnite se-
quence of players, and we used the following stopping rule. The ﬁrstNOTE 268
player, P , did not make a choice, but his or her payoffs were affected by 1
the choice of the next player. After player P had made a choice, there was 2
a 90% probability that an additional player, P , was added to the sequence 3
and a 10% probability that player P was the last player. In the latter case 2
Ž. the game ended, and the ﬁnal player P in this case earned a ﬁxed payoff 2
of 40 guilders. In the former case the game continued and player P made 3
a choice. Table I shows the payoffs in guilders for subjects that are not at
the beginning or the end of the sequence.
3 Then a 9010 lottery again
determined whether an additional player, P , was added to the sequence. 4
This procedure was repeated until the game ended. As we explained to our
subjects, we carried out this lottery procedure before the start of the
experiment. Subjects were randomly allocated to a position in the se-
quence. A subject made at most one choice in the sequence. We invited
Ž. more people to the experiment at least 19 than the number determined
Ž. by the lottery the maximum length of a sequence was 12 . Therefore,
some subjects did not make a choice at all, because the sequence was
closed before it was their turn to choose. Subjects who did not make a
choice earned a ﬁxed payoff of 40 guilders.
Our solution for inducing an inﬁnite horizon is not a perfect one. In
particular, subjects could infer an upperbound on the length of the
sequence from the number of subjects present in the lab. However, a
perfect solution probably does not exist. There is no generally accepted
Ž method of inducing an inﬁnite horizon in experimental games see, e.g.,
. Ochs, 1995, especially notes 8 and 9 . Often some variant of the stopping
Ž. rule is used. Strictly speaking, any constant random stopping probability
is incredible, because subjects know that the experiment will have to be
Ž. stopped at some point e.g., because the building closes . Some experi-
menters have therefore chosen not to tell the subjects anything about how
often the game will be repeated. This procedure has its own problems,
however. For one thing, subjects will form their own subjective beliefs
about the number of repetitions without the experimenter having any
control about these beliefs.
It is particularly difﬁcult to induce an inﬁnite horizon in overlapping
generations games, because the random device determines how many
subjects are needed and not merely how long they will be in the lab. Some
experimenters have tried to solve this problem by ‘‘reincarnating’’ subjects
Ž and using them repeatedly at different places in the same sequence e.g.,
. Lim et al., 1994 . We did not use this procedure because it may introduce
Ž. undesirable repeated play considerations and because it gives subjects
3The structure of the payoffs is similar to a prisoner’s dilemma. Our payoff matrix is
comparable to the payoff matrices used in other experimental studies on the prisoner’s
dilemma.NOTE 269
Ž the opportunity to learn about the strategies of others while we are
. particularly interested in applications in which people only play once .
Another possibility would have been to implement a game with a ﬁxed
length, where the last player actually knows she is last. Since the last
player’s payoff does not depend on her choice, she could choose to play
cooperatively if and only if the previous player played cooperatively. Thus,
cooperation can be supported as an equilibrium in a game with a known
ﬁxed end. Note, however, that in the cooperative equilibrium the last
player in the ﬁnite game does not strictly increase her expected payoff by
Ž. adhering to a grim trigger strategy, in contrast to all the players in the
inﬁnitely repeated game. Hence, the cooperative equilibrium in a game
with ﬁnite length relies on weaker incentives than the one in an inﬁnitely
repeated game.
When the basic structure of the game had been explained to the
subjects, they had ample time to practice. In the practice phase subjects
Ž made choices for all participants in the row to avoid any guidance about
. what to choose . When a subject entered a choice, the computer deter-
mined the corresponding payoffs and whether an additional player was
added to the sequence, for which the subject then again entered a choice.
In some practice rounds the subjects were requested to enter the corre-
sponding payoffs themselves, and then the computer reported whether the
answer was correct.
4
After the practice phase subjects were informed that they also had to
write a strategy for this game. A strategy for this game requires a player to
make a decision for any possible position in the sequence and for any
possible history of choices by earlier players in the row. To help subjects
formulate a strategy, we provided them with some forms containing
‘‘strategy classes,’’ differing in the degree to which choices are dependent
on history. The experiment was carried out twice, once with the formulated
strategies and once in the natural time order. When making a choice in
the natural time order, a subject had information about all choices of her
predecessors.
Subjects formulated a strategy before they chose in the natural time
order. The results of the strategy experiment were communicated only
after the end of the natural time experiment to avoid the subjects’ learning
about other subjects’ strategies. In playing out the strategy experiment,
subjects were put in the same row and place as in the baseline experiment.
Before subjects were paid they ﬁlled out a post-experimental question-
4The post-experimental questionnaire suggests that this procedure gave them a good
understanding of the game. For example, 98% of the subjects indicated that the instructions
were clear, 90% did not ﬁnd it too difﬁcult to formulate a strategy, and only 5% indicated
that they were provided with too little information about the decisions of other participants.NOTE 270
naire. Finally, each subject threw a six-sided die. When the throw yielded
1, 2, or 3, his or her payoffs in the strategy experiment were used for actual
payment, and when it yielded 4, 5, or 6, the payoffs of the natural time
order experiment were used.
The only difference between the baseline and recommendation treat-
ment was that in the latter treatment subjects received the following
recommendation at the end of the instructions: ‘‘A participant of a
previous experiment made a recommendation to participants of future
experiments which amounted to: ‘I recommend the second participant to
choose A; I recommend each subsequent participant to choose A if all
previous participants in the row choose A and to choose B otherwise. If
everybody sticks to this recommendation, then it is in each participant’s
interest to stick to it. A choice for A is then rewarded with a choice for A
by the subsequent participant, while a choice for B is punished with a
choice for B by the subsequent participant in the sequence. In this way the
aggregate payoff of all participants will be as large as possible.’’’
Subjects were recruited at Tilburg University. A total of 156 subjects
participated in the experiment, 78 in the baseline treatment and 78 in the
recommendation treatment. In each treatment 9 independent sequences
were formed with lengths varying between 4 and 12 players. In each
Ž. session we ran 2 or 3 sequences rows at the same time. This allowed us to
Ž. have many more subjects in the lab at least 19 than the expected length
Ž. of a sequence which is 10 with a stopping probability of 10% . This
procedure prevented subjects from anticipating the length of a sequence
from the number of subjects in the room. Redundant subjects did not play
in the natural time order experiment, but they did formulate a strategy.
3. RESULTS
Table II presents the aggregate number of choices in the baseline
experiment in each of the two treatments. In both treatments subjects did
not succeed very well in exploiting the intertemporal structure of the game
TABLE II
Choices in the Natural Time Order Experiment
Treatment
Choice Baseline Recommendation Total
Ž. Ž . Ž . A 13.8% 858 29.3% 1758 21.6% 25116
Ž. Ž. Ž . B 86.2% 5058 70.7% 4158 78.4% 91116NOTE 271
to enforce the cooperative outcome. In the baseline treatment, only 13.8%
Ž. of the choices were cooperative A . The recommendation offered in the
recommendation treatment did stimulate cooperative play to some extent.
In this treatment subjects made 29.3% cooperative choices. The difference
in cooperative play between the baseline treatment and the recommenda-
tion treatment misses conventional levels of signiﬁcance, though. A two-
tailed MannWhitney test with the percentages of A choices in each of the
18 sequences as observations gives a signiﬁcance level of p  0.11.
There is some evidence that cooperation in the recommendation treat-
ment is to some extent history dependent. Cooperative choices were
followed by a cooperative choice in 41.2% of the cases, whereas a nonco-
operative choice was followed by a cooperative choice in only 18.2% of the
cases. In the baseline treatment, on the other hand, no cooperative choice
Ž was followed by another cooperative choice but here, of course, we have
. few cooperative choices in all .
One may also wonder whether cooperative choices were typically made
earlier or later in the sequence. To investigate this we compare the
Ž. average rank numbers place in the row of subjects choosing cooperatively
with those choosing noncooperatively. Averaged over all sequences with at
least one cooperative choice, the average rank number is 4.71 for a
cooperative choice and 4.80 for a noncooperative choice. Hence, there is
no difference of cooperative play between the earlier and later players.
The same holds if we look at the baseline and recommendation treatments
separately. Furthermore, the rate of cooperation does not seem to depend
much on the actual length of a sequence. For example, the average
fraction of cooperative choices was 0.21 in sequences smaller than 7 and
0.24 in sequences larger than 10. Moreover, almost all of the subjects
formulated stationary strategies, that is, strategies that are independent of
the place of the subject in the sequence. None of the strategies tried to
forecast the actual length of the sequence or to make provision for the
Ž. expected end of the sequence. This supports the view that subjects played
the game as if it were inﬁnitely repeated.
The strategies formulated by the subjects help us to understand the
failure to arrive at cooperative play. Table III summarizes the strategies
formulated by the subjects. In our baseline treatment a large majority of
the subjects, 76.9%, developed strategies that did not make use in any way
of the intertemporal structure of the game. Most of these subjects uncon-
Ž. ditionally chose B. Only 12 subjects 15.4% spontaneously developed a
trigger strategy.
A recommendation to play a grim trigger strategy clearly inspired
subjects to submit conditional strategies. A substantial proportion of the
population followed the recommendation, and some others developed




Strategy Baseline Recommendation Total
Ž. Ž . Ž . Always A 9 11.5% 5 6.4% 14 9.0%
Ž. Ž. Ž. Always B 51 65.4% 37 47.4% 88 56.4%
Ž. Ž. Recommended strategy  20 25.6% 20 12.8%
Ž. Ž. Ž. Other trigger 12 15.4% 16 20.5% 28 17.9%
Ž. Ž . Ž. Miscellaneous 6 7.7% 0 0% 6 3.8%
Ž. Ž. Ž. Total 78 100% 78 100% 156 100%
dation treatment submitted a trigger strategy, compared to only 15.4% in
Ž 2 the baseline treatment. This difference is highly signiﬁcant   17.3 at
p  .001; note that for this test we can use each strategy submitted by a
. subject as an independent observation . Yet, even in the recommendation
Ž. treatment, a large fraction 47.4% of the subjects chose to play noncoop-
Ž. eratively unconditionally always B .
The availability of actual choice data and strategies allows us to investi-
gate the consistency between choices made in the natural time order
experiment and the strategies submitted. In the baseline treatment 4 of 58
Ž. choices 6.9% are inconsistent with what would have been prescribed by
the strategy submitted. The level of inconsistency is considerably higher in
Ž. the recommendation treatment. Here, 15 of 58 choices 25.9% are incon-
sistent with the strategy. There is a remarkable pattern in the inconsisten-
cies in the recommendation treatment. Nine times a subject selected the
recommended strategy but played cooperatively in the natural time order
experiment when the strategy would have chosen to defect.
In summary, Table III indicates that subjects’ choices of strategy were
signiﬁcantly affected by the recommendation. At the same time, Table II
indicates that their actual choices in the natural time order experiment
were affected by the recommendation to a lesser and insigniﬁcant extent.
The reason for this is that the employment of trigger strategies by one part
Ž. of the population i.e., 46.1% does not lead to cooperation if another part
Ž. of the population i.e., 47.4% plays noncooperatively unconditionally.
Punishment is often triggered indeed.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper provides an experimental investigation of Hammond’s Pen-
sion Game, the most basic type of overlapping generations game. OurNOTE 273
results show that subjects did not easily arrive at a cooperative outcome
and did not spontaneously employ trigger strategies. When we provided
subjects with a recommendation to play the grim trigger strategy they
became aware of the potential for cooperation offered by the intertempo-
Ž. ral structure of the game. A substantial fraction of the subjects 46.1%
Ž. then submitted trigger strategies, whereas only a few 15.4% did so
without a recommendation. However, a substantial part of the population
Ž. 47.7% still chose unconditionally the safe option of not cooperating. As a
result, cooperation was not greatly facilitated by the increased use of
trigger strategies because punishment was often triggered.
Theoretically, cooperation can be self-enforcing in overlapping genera-
tions games like the one we have implemented. Nevertheless, our results
suggest that cooperation may not always be the most likely outcome of
such games. Many players preferred the safe unconditional defecting
strategy above a risky trigger strategy, even when a recommendation made
them aware of the potential beneﬁts of the grim trigger strategy. There-
fore, merely establishing that a cooperative outcome is an equilibrium, as
is done in many applications of overlapping generations models, is not
likely to be a sufﬁcient condition for the actual occurrence of cooperation.
It would seem that other facilitating factors are necessary to actually
achieve cooperation. We have investigated one such factora general
recommendation to play the grim trigger strategyand found that this
alone was not sufﬁcient.
Of course, there are other factors that may facilitate cooperation in
overlapping generations games. First, people may learn to play coopera-
tively when they play a game repeatedly. This argument draws some
Ž. support from the experimental study by Selten and Stoecker 1986 . They
ﬁnd that subjects learn to play a trigger-like strategy in a repeated game
Ž. after they have played many ﬁnitely repeated games against the same
Ž. opponent. The experimental study of Van der Heijden et al. 1998 ,
however, does not indicate that cooperation rates increase with repeated
play of overlapping generations games. Furthermore, for many applications
the suggestion that people play overlapping generations games repeatedly
does not make much sense. For example, once you have learned whether
or not your children will support you when you are oldpossibly in
response to how you have treated your parents when you were young
there is no second chance which allows you to revise your strategy. Hence,
for many applications of overlapping generations games, any learning
should take place before or during the play of the game and not across
repeated plays of the game. One possibility is that direct communication
between successive generations of players generates trust, which may
Ž. facilitate cooperation see also Kotlikoff et al., 1988 .NOTE 274
Second, it may be the case that some of our subjects did not choose the
recommended grim trigger strategy because they felt that the strategy is
too unforgiving. The lack of a systematic decline in the cooperation rates
in the natural time order experiment suggests that very few subjects
actually played in accordance with the grim trigger strategy. Possibly, more
subjects would have been attracted to the recommended strategy if it had
been more forgiving. Consider, for example, the ‘‘resilient’’ strategy
Ž. Bhaskar, 1998 . This strategy punishes a defector, but it does not punish
someone who punished a defector. It prescribes cooperation unless an odd
Ž number of the direct predecessors defected after the previous cooperative
. choice . More formally, let  be a state variable that takes one of two t
Ž. Ž . values, C or D with   C , and let the strategy of player tt  2b e 1
Ž. Ž. Ž. described by  , with   Ai f  C and   Bi f tt 1 tt 1 t1 tt 1
  D. The state variable takes the value   D if and only if the t1 t
choice by player t was B when the state variable  was C. A recom- t1
Ž. mendation to play this or a similar subgame perfect strategy may lead to
higher levels of cooperation. We leave it to future work to investigate
these possibilities.
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